# Aff Answers

## Solvency

### 2AC – Solvency – Generic

#### It fails – duplicity, internal divisions, and empirics.

ND 22 [New Direction, 05-22-2022, "Why an EU Army is a bad idea – We don’t need a political bloc of the unwilling", https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/why\_an\_eu\_army\_is\_a\_bad\_idea\_we\_dont\_need\_a\_political\_bloc\_of\_the\_unwilling, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

You might argue that it can only be a good thing if the Europeans step up their defence arrangements. But this has little to do with increasing military muscle. It is not the answer to the plea by successive US presidents for the Europeans to do more on defence. NATO is well established, well proven and credible. 27 of its 30 member countries are European, including 21 that also happen to be EU countries. So why create another structure?

Any EU force would have to draw on the same limited military resources and would be a duplicative, divisive distraction. EU ambitions already intrude into NATO where coordination structures between the two organisations have now been set up, in spite of the fact that their membership is largely the same. The EU wants to become the European leg of NATO – so where would that leave key non-EU European members of NATO such as the UK, Norway and Turkey? In any case, the EU countries can’t even agree among themselves. Many pay lip service to the idea of CSDP while refusing to participate in any meaningful way. Even the arch-federalist European Parliament, in its most recent report on EU defence, noted that “in over 15 years of existence EU battlegroups have never been used, in particular due to the lack of political consensus among Member States and the complexity of implementation and funding…”

At NATO HQ in the early ‘90s, the French were already pushing for European military capabilities separate from NATO. When the Bosnian crisis began they demanded that the matter should be discussed not at NATO but ‘in another place’ – by which they meant the Western European Union (WEU), a purely European group whose headquarters was just down the road in central Brussels. As a consequence, nonsensically, two allied navies operated in the Adriatic and Mediterranean, one under NATO command and the other under WEU, with more or less the same ships rotating between the two. Once the Bosnian military operations got more serious, even France gave up on this farce and backed the NATO option.

#### Creating EU strategic autonomy trades off with security cooperation AND causes hot internal debates that divide the EU.

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3.1.2 Reconciling Strategic Sovereignty and the Transatlantic Relationship The idea that the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to military crises goes back to the 1998 St. Malo Declaration. Since then, the question of what constitutes an acceptable balance between a more independent European security and defence policy and transatlantic security cooperation in NATO has been hotly disputed on both sides of the Atlantic. The fear of upsetting the US and jeopardising the American security commitment to Europe was a good reason for many European member states to keep EU defence efforts to a minimum. However, the election of Donald Trump as US president has decisively changed the parameters of the debate. The US’ strong footprint in European security could no longer be taken for granted. For many Europeans, this was a wake-up moment that brought the need for greater autonomy from the US back into focus. At the same time, the very notion of ‘strategic autonomy’ became toxic. While Europeans insisted that strategic autonomy was not synonymous with a Europe ‘going it alone’, Washington, but also some EU member states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, perceived it as an attempt for de-coupling and hence as a threat. On this account, German defence minister Annegret KrampKarrenbauer spoke on behalf of many Europeans when she sent her message to the incoming Biden administration in November 2020: ‘The idea of strategic autonomy for Europe goes too far if it is taken to mean that we could guarantee security, stability and prosperity in Europe without NATO and without the US’. 36 The related dispute between her and French President Emmanuel Macron has once again shown that Europeans themselves have not yet agreed on how far Europe should be able to act independently of the United States.

#### Only the US can do security cooperation with NATO on AI---EU is far behind on funding, adoption, and private investment.

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Before proceeding, it is worth spelling out the extent to which European security is dependent on NATO and in particular on the US. Of the EU’s 27 member states, 21 are members of NATO. These countries account for about 93% of the population1 of the EU. Within NATO, those Allies that are also EU members only account for about 20% of total defence expenditure across the Alliance, while the US alone accounts for about 70% of the same total.2 Beyond these aggregate indicators, it is furthermore the case that the US is considerably ahead of the EU in terms of practical adoption of AI. For illustration, in 2020 US private-sector investment in AI was around $23.6 billion, but was only $2 billion in the EU, implying a ratio of 12 to 1 in favour of the US (Zhang et al. 2021, 96). Scientific output indicators offer a more nuanced picture. In 2019, the EU accounted for 16.4% of the world’s peer-reviewed AI publications, ahead of the US with 14.6%, while China occupied the top spot with 22.4% (Zhang et al. 2021, 20). On the other hand, if one measures research output in terms of publications on the Arxiv database, the US is ahead of the EU (Zhang et al. 2021, 33) by a ratio of almost two to one, which is nonetheless much less than the large gap in private investment mentioned above. That the EU performs similarly to the US in terms of scientific research, but far less well in terms of investment and commercialisation of new digital technologies, is an old problem which has proven very difficult to address, whether at national or EU level (Baroudy et al. 2020).

#### Technical impracticalities between EU states and ideological divergences mean EU-NATO cooperation fail.

Akturan et al 18, EUChicago, (Ozan Beran Akturan, Jordi Vasquez, Noah McLean, Aurore Tigerschiold, and Forrest Alonso Haydon, “”, The University of Chicago’s Chapter for European Horizons, <https://voices.uchicago.edu/euchicago/nato-eu-cooperation-transatlantic-perspectives-on-regional-security-issues/>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

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However, the difference in how commitment to respective sets of values is executed in NATO and EU results with a wide portfolio of cooperational problems, ranging from bureaucratic to strategic, despite their intention to work together. Could there be comprehensive and mutually respectful cooperation between the two organizations on security issues? Would this cooperation be wearproof given the bilateral conflicts brought up by non-joint members, such as in the Cyprus dilemma? This article surveys how bilateral and regional conflicts challenge the international resolve for transatlantic security cooperation, in which NATO and EU share common milito-political interest.

The European Common Security and Defense Policy: Boon or Bane

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), known before 2009’s Lisbon Treaty as the European Security and Defence Policy, represented the apex of security cooperation among European Union member states and the EU’s undertaking of a heavier defence role along with NATO. The CSDP seeks to exercise European military independence from NATO within five areas: the self-assured security of the EU, a closer relationship between eastern and western Europe, structural improvement in European conflict management, cooperation between neighboring regions, and pioneering global governance of conflicts. To implement these priorities into pre-existing European structural mechanisms, the EU’s civilian-military status has undergone an updating process. For instance, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was created through the Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007, which made the EU constitutional laws legally binding and further centralized the Union. The Lisbon Treaty also sought to address the independent methods in which the EU member states were answering international crises.

When EEAS was launched in December 2010 as an EU department with the express function of consolidating EU responses to international security issues as an autonomous unit, it actualized CSDP’s vision for a new European crisis management strategy which technically compelled member states to cooperate in situations of security threats, in or out of the EU. Initiatives similar to EAAS make clear what the EU lacks has not been the incentive to incorporate an international security dimension to its agenda, but the technical practicality to implement decisions to that end in a unified manner. Although common goals had been set for NATO-EU cooperation through the Berlin Plus Agreements in 2003 before CSDP, creation of a unified transatlantic defence and security policy between the two entities has encountered ample executive difficulties. For instance, Cyprus – an EU but not NATO member- was excluded from joint EU-NATO meetings by Turkey – a NATO but not EU member- due to the decades long political antagonism over the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974. Even this seemingly inconsequential bilateral problem was enough to [halt]~~paralyze~~ the NATO-EU cooperation, making some organizational details of Berlin Plus Agreement impossible.

Berlin Agreement’s decision to create a merged NATO-EU headquarters in Brussels to manage conflicts in which both the EU and NATO have common interests has not helped reduce the fracture between American and European politics. For instance, when France and Germany coordinated a joint gathering with Belgium and Luxembourg to protest the British-American invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, NATO and then American government denounced it as “Chocolate Summit,” betraying the spirit of cooperation aimed by CSDP. Joint NATO-EU missions for stabilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004, in Dafur, Sudan, as an assistance to African Union or in Somali to combat piracy are, however, some successful products of Berlin Plus Agreements. These joint undertakings are cases in which not all the EU or NATO members were interested in intervention, but they were made possible by sharing of military expertise and assets from either of the parties, mostly by NATO. However, post-colonial Africa and Western Balkans are regions over which NATO and EU do not have strong strategic disagreements. Despite Berlin Plus, EU has been critical of NATO’s call for joint missions in Afghanistan for instance and only supported the civilian projects of current Resolute Support Mission of NATO.

Bilateral hurdles in front of NATO-EU cooperation such as Cyprus Dispute are hence not the actual root causes hindering the constructive attitude of Berlin Plus. As Europe’s disapproval of Iraqi invasion or reluctance of cooperation in Afghanistan demonstrates, the CSDP cannot overcome the strategic divergence of NATO and EU in issues of incompatible political interests. Ideological divergence of the two partners should be reconciled before the region specific problems are addressed by calls for joint military actions. The new and more NATO-conscious level of ambition for CSDP thus required European member states to invest more in security and defence, both politically and economic. Perhaps an important undertaking was revisiting Berlin Plus Agreement’s comfort in EU utilizing NATO asset and capabilities when necessary, instead initiating more EU-focused solutions like EAAS.

With the attenuation of this cooperative ethos in both sides, there is a present risk that NATO and the EU will begin to compete for limited military resources, straying from the envisioned Berlin Plus Agreement. Lack of a coherent strategy among Western partners could prevent efficient response to crises, which does not bode well in a time of humanitarian atrocities — whether it be in Syria, Yemen, or South Sudan.

#### New initiatives set a clear signal that the EU is working towards tech sovereignty in the squo.

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EU TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY IS IN THE MAKING

Behind the EU’s recent multiple sovereignty agendas is the need to stay ahead of the curve when it comes to innovation. The very label of a geopolitical European Commission implies a new level of engagement for the EU in the global balance of power. Technological and digital sovereignty are at the heart of such ambitions. The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic has further exacerbated the urgency to shore up technological, digital, and regulatory responses to preserve the EU’s economic clout, industrial competitiveness, and geopolitical influence, as well as to reduce dependencies in critical technology areas. What has the EU done so far, and what must it still do to meet that goal of technological sovereignty? Four cross-cutting dimensions can help unpack the concept of technological sovereignty and better structure the discussion about EU initiatives, programs, and instruments: Research and capability-development efforts in security and defense Investments in cutting-edge research and innovation and in digitalization Critical infrastructure resilience and security of supply Tech-related regulatory activism

DEFENSE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

According to Arnout Molenaar, the head of division in the European External Action Service, dealing with security and defense policy is also related to “a learning curve for the Union to develop a ‘hard power’ mentality.” Technology plays a fundamental role in terms of making possible the EU’s hard military power ambitions—not only to act in a tense geopolitical setting but also to defend the EU’s interests in areas related to technology, security, and defense matters. In this regard, collaborative EU defense research and development (R&D) initiatives have been prioritized at the EU level for some time now to support the competitiveness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.

EU institutions and agencies have made considerable efforts to preserve Europe’s edge in key areas, including emerging and disruptive security technologies and infrastructures such as cybersecurity, drones, secure networks, space technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum technology. Indeed, recent EU initiatives such as the European Commission’s European Defence Fund (EDF) as part of the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), 2021–2027—as well as its precursor programs, the Preparatory Action on Defence Research and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme—are intended to financially empower the EU’s autonomy in defense technology and industry and its research and innovation capacity in future-oriented and disruptive defense technologies.

Such initiatives have been framed as timely catalysts and potential game changers for increasing collective European action and for fostering cutting-edge defense research and innovation in Europe. The commission funded the Preparatory Action on Defence Research as a test case of defense-related research and technology projects, pulling directly from the EU budget line rather than from member states’ joint initiatives. This scheme was a concrete step designed to demonstrate the added value of EU-supported defense technology research and innovation. If successfully implemented, the EDF is expected to bolster more lucrative and joint research and capability-driven investment schemes in defense technologies across Europe and to increase the EU’s global leadership position in strategic tech sectors. The commission has already pledged a relatively small percentage of up to 8 percent of the EDF funding to disruptive technology actions. However, with the initially proposed amount of 13 billion euros ($15.4 billion) now reduced to about 8 billion euros ($9.5 billion), the EDF’s real potential to create value added and to incentivize technological and industrial cooperation and competitiveness in Europe is unclear. Indeed, this reduction could be accounted for by the fact that some member states either took a budget-restrictive approach to the entire 2021–2027 MFF or judged that on balance, they would benefit less from the EDF than their contribution to it and thus opted for reducing the overall funding. What is certain is that the EDF marks an important paradigm shift in consolidating the EU’s increased supranational activism in the field of defense technology and industry as a basis for building the EU’s military hard power and defense portfolio. The fund also consolidates the European Commission’s increasing role and strong interventionism in the EU security and defense policy fields that have traditionally been the exclusive preserve of member states’ decisionmaking.

There is also a clear message that developing the defense industry and technology base in Europe is key to strategic autonomy. Hence, logic dictates that defense-related technological sovereignty is central to the EU’s strategic autonomy. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the reduced funding dedicated to the EDF and the small percentage of it that is flagged for disruptive military technologies are sufficient to foster high-risk, high-reward technological innovation in the European defense sector.

#### Squo solves EU autonomy---E12 and NORDEFCO.

Retter et al 21, 1) Lucia Retter is a research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition, M.A. in international relations and international economics, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); B.A. in modern and medieval languages, University of Cambridge, 2) Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; M.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po); M.A. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; B.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po) 3) Stephen J. Flanagan is an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. Ph.D. in international relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University; A.B. in political science, Columbia University 4) Gene Germanovich is an international defense researcher and currently serves as the acting international portfolio lead for the RAND National Security Research Division. B.S. in international affairs, Georgia Tech; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University 5) Sarah Grand-Clement; publisher, 6) Pauline Paillé is an analyst at RAND Europe working in the area of defence and security. M.A. in international relations, Sciences Po Bordeaux (“European Strategic Autonomy in Defence: Transatlantic visions and implications for NATO, US and EU relations”, RAND Europe, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RRA1319-1.html) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

In addition to these overarching EU initiatives, a number of separate bi- and multi-lateral groupings and frameworks have also emerged in the last 10 to 15 years, aiming to unite like-minded nations in pursuit of greater defence integration. This trend further confirms that EU member states and partners recognise that, individually, their defence capabilities are insufficient to independently deliver most, if not all, defence missions and that collaboration and harmonisation are necessary. Under the leadership of French President Macron, for example, the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) was launched in 2018 to be an agile, nonbinding, voluntary forum, among the most capable European governments willing to employ their military forces, complementary both to the EU (including PESCO) and NATO.88 The EI2 seeks to deepen cooperation in four areas: intelligence sharing and strategic foresight, planning and scenario development, support to operations and lessons learned.89 In practice, the initiative consists of meetings between the militaries of participating member states and periodically at the ministerial level.90 In Northern Europe, for example, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden take part in the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), a political and military framework that establishes cooperation in five areas: capabilities, armament, human resources and education, training and exercises as well as operations. The aim of NORDEFCO is to increase interoperability between those five members, develop a common understanding in these areas and optimise the use of their resources based on their common strategic culture.91 In addition, members of the Northern Group, including 12 countries bordering on the Baltic or North Sea, have been working to deepen regional defence and security cooperation including on information sharing, exercises and military mobility.92

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Retter et al 21, 1) Lucia Retter is a research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition, M.A. in international relations and international economics, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); B.A. in modern and medieval languages, University of Cambridge, 2) Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; M.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po); M.A. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; B.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po) 3) Stephen J. Flanagan is an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. Ph.D. in international relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University; A.B. in political science, Columbia University 4) Gene Germanovich is an international defense researcher and currently serves as the acting international portfolio lead for the RAND National Security Research Division. B.S. in international affairs, Georgia Tech; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University 5) Sarah Grand-Clement; publisher, 6) Pauline Paillé is an analyst at RAND Europe working in the area of defence and security. M.A. in international relations, Sciences Po Bordeaux (“European Strategic Autonomy in Defence: Transatlantic visions and implications for NATO, US and EU relations”, RAND Europe, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RRA1319-1.html) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

In the last five years, direct association between EU defence integration efforts (such as CDP, CARD, PESCO, EDF) and the notion of European strategic autonomy has become widespread – at least when this term is understood to mean defence and a narrower understanding of ‘security’ rather than, say, economic self-reliance. Yet the pace of cooperation and emergence of new structures hides a wide range of official positions held by different EU member states, and differing views and visions even within each individual nation’s politics. Most notably, the views of European officials and experts differ on the question of leadership, the degree of autonomy, the desired level of the EU’s ambition and the optimal balance between national and joint capability development. These various divergences, jointly, and separately, undermine the cohesiveness and therefore the feasibility and credibility of the general ambition to achieve European strategic autonomy. This section briefly outlines the issues pertaining to each of these categories of debate and disagreement.

### 1AR – Solvency – Generic

#### EU initiatives fail---inter-state tensions, weak militaries, and over-dependence on the US.

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Yet NATO-EU cooperation remains somewhat limited because of political tensions between member states (which hinders intelligence sharing) as well as weak European military capabilities and inadequate defense spending. Over the past few years the EU has made important progress in this domain through the establishment of the European Defense Fund and several defense projects under the Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism. Yet, according to several studies in the field, the state of European defense appears insufficient to tackle more serious military threats or to enable the EU to take initiatives in its neighborhood independently from the United States. In its “Strategic Compass” to be published in March 2022, the EU is supposed to adopt a bolder approach to its defense capabilities. In parallel, in a new strategic concept to be released in June 2022, NATO is supposed to tackle security throughout a widened angle, looking at domains that are not strictly defense-related.

### 2AC – Solvency – Overlap

#### Overlap, lack of communication, distrust, and military vulnerabilities severely limit cooperation.

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

PROBLEMS IN NATO-EU COOPERATION As the overall strategic interests and security priorities of NATO and the EU have begun to overlap in response to emerging global challenges, the relationship — and hence cooperation — between the two organizations has become more complex. Limited communication channels Although personnel exchanges and joint exercises have helped to set up a framework and a mindset for more integrated operations, officials interviewed for this paper24 under the condition of anonymity pointed out that information sharing and the results achieved have been very limited. The lack of a secure communication system to share information between the two organizations severely hinders their ability to work together on a daily basis but most importantly to coordinate in a real crisis scenario and consequently to put in place a joint response. As of now, there is no direct inter-institutional secure lines of communication between the EU and NATO. All communications take place between each member state and either within NATO or within the EU. This also is particularly relevant when it comes to sharing best practices or handing over tasks from one organization to the other.25

Political tensions and different strategic priorities Adding to this communication difficulty, political tensions have multiplied within both NATO and the EU, triggering a climate of distrust that prevents intelligence sharing. Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles26 and its invasion of northern Syria after U.S. troops withdrew raised security concerns in the alliance, while the Northern Cyprus question and Ankara’s activities in the eastern Mediterranean waters have created tensions with Greece.27 Relations between France and the U.K. have also significantly worsened since the AUKUS deal, which could ultimately impact the functioning of NATO. Complicating matters further, as described above, the two organizations’ activities have started to overlap, with NATO embracing capacity-building and cyber operations and the EU stepping up on crisis management. More recently, during preparation of its strategic concept, NATO has been questioning its role in the fight against climate change and in countering China’s multifaceted influence in the trans-Atlantic space. And following the AUKUS deal, the EU has been reflecting on developing a stronger military to be able to respond to crises directly impacting its security. NATO opposes any form of duplication, from command to resources, which is quite telling in terms of its soul-searching for the definition of its objectives and its range of action vis-à-vis global challenges.28 Recent events in Afghanistan offer a very good opportunity to reflect on the role of NATO and EU aspirations. After the Taliban took back Kabul, NATO called for an assessment of the accomplishments and failures of ISAF and Resolute Support.29 But instead the EU — not directly involved in Afghanistan as an organization but rather through individual member states — and the United Kingdom reflected on their excessive dependence on the United States in areas of paramount importance to European security. As evacuation operations started in Kabul, with devastating images traveling around the world, Borrell defined Afghanistan as a “wake-up call” for the strengthening of European defense.30 Allies complained about the United States’ lack of coordination and communication on the withdrawal, its unwillingness to extend the deadline for evacuations. For its part, the United Nation Security Council rejected a French-U.K. proposal to establish of a U.N.-controlled safe zone around the Kabul airport.31 While it is debatable whether or not the EU would have used its hypothetical army to secure Kabul’s airport, the Afghanistan experience exposed Europeans’ vivid vulnerabilities in the security domain and their dependence on the U.S. military’s logistical and technological capabilities.

#### Bureaucratic procedures, misalignments, and overlap tank coordination.

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EDTs = Emerging and Disruptive Technologies

The Biden administration also provides a window of opportunity to progress and be ambitious in broadening and regularizing NATO-EU cooperation in the field of innovation and EDTs. While political dialogue among their leadership has been steadily increasing over the past five years, the EU and NATO have consulted on their respective EDTs agendas only twice. Furthermore, bureaucratic procedures and misalignments sometimes frustrate even staff-to-staff cooperation in this area. The EU and increasingly NATO are proliferating agencies that conduct work on innovation in EDTs, including in security and defense. This makes it challenging to achieve internal coherence of activities within one organization, let alone coordinating agendas between the two.

### 2AC – Solvency – Undermines NATO

#### EU defense policy decks NATO.

The Week 22 [Week UK, 03-29-2022, "The arguments for and against an EU army", https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/956217/the-arguments-for-and-against-an-eu-army, DOA: 6-25-2022 //ArchanSen]

One of Britain’s key concerns about the prospect of an EU army was that it would duplicate or undermine the role of Nato.

Bart M.J. Szewczyk, from the US think tank the German Marshall Fund, agreed that it is “illogical” that a federal EU defence policy would be any better at “raising spending, pooling resources, or improving procurement” than current structures such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Nato allies and partners working as a team in long-established modes of cooperation – and not an inexperienced EU working at cross-purposes or even actively undermining the alliance – will remain the security provider of first resort for Europe,” he wrote in Foreign Policy.

### 2AC – Solvency – Say No

#### Say no.

The Week 22 [Week UK, 03-29-2022, "The arguments for and against an EU army", https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/956217/the-arguments-for-and-against-an-eu-army, DOA: 6-25-2022 //ArchanSen]

History shows there have been numerous failed attempts at forming an EU army, with opposition from outside the union and within. Critics suggest these disagreements would continue even if the idea was signed off. In a 2018 opinion piece for the Atlantic Council, international security and defence analyst Brooks Tigner wrote that the bloc would face a plethora of “technical, legal, and administrative differences” that would “boil down to the most mundane things such as soldiers’ rights”. Operational costs and caveats “always pose major headaches”, he added. The Telegraph’s James Crisp warned that there were “already grumbles” about French defence companies receiving “preferential and lucrative contracts”. “Diplomats joke that Mr Macron is in favour of a European army as long as it is a very French European army,” he said.

### 2AC – Solvency – Funding

#### The EU is broke – gotta get the US to pay – they’ll have 1/5th of the money.

ND 22 [New Direction, 05-22-2022, "Why an EU Army is a bad idea – We don’t need a political bloc of the unwilling", https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/why\_an\_eu\_army\_is\_a\_bad\_idea\_we\_dont\_need\_a\_political\_bloc\_of\_the\_unwilling, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

Arguments are made that limited European resources would be more effective if integrated. This has become one of the EU’s main selling points for EU defence. It sounds plausible – but if you add up the defence budgets of 26 EU countries (Denmark has opted out of EU defence) you arrive at a figure of approximately $200 billion (2020) or 1.5% of the accumulated GDPs of these countries. The US spent about $800 billion, which is some 3.7% of GDP. And you certainly do not need EU involvement to create joint forces with allies. The history of purposeful coalitions goes back centuries. In recent times, under NATO, we have had the 14-nation ACE Mobile Force, the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, and the German/Dutch Corps as examples of closely aligned national formations. All this has worked perfectly well. There is no need for EU involvement – unless of course your motives are political rather than military.

### 2AC – Solvency – AI – Generic

#### EU fails---decentralization, overdependence on US, and slow adoption.

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The European Union’s Juncker 26 Commission (2014-2019) actively avoided regulating AI, causing the European Parliament to increase their efforts as a proactive voice in favor of stronger AI regulation. However, since the beginning of Ursula von der Leyen’s tenure, the Commission has initiated efforts to adopt stronger regulation for AI applications (i.e., differentiating regulation of AI based on defined “high-risk” and “low-risk” sectors”) and associated data spaces.27,28 These legislative proposals and their associated discussions are planned to be completed by the end of 2020. During the strategic planning and budgeting process of its R&D programs, the EU committed to providing at least EUR10.7 billion29 for AI-related research conducted between 2021 and 2027.30 Despite these financial and political efforts, the EU still remains technologically dependent on the US and China and suffers from a lack of capital and private funding, decentralized and uncoordinated AI expertise, severe brain drain (including to the US), and slow adoption of AI programming in its education and public sectors.

### 2AC – Solvency – AI – Commercialization

#### The EU will seek commercial advantages on AI which undermines broader cooperation.

Franke 21, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative. Her areas of focus include German and European security and defence, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence on geopolitics and warfare., (Ulrike, “Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI”, European Council on Foreign Relations, <https://ecfr.eu/publication/artificial-divide-how-europe-and-america-could-clash-over-ai/#why-work-together-disagreements-and-shared-goals>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

The EU’s effort to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe, might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that AI is developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness.

### 2AC – Solvency – Cyber – PPP

#### Private-public partnerships within the EU fail to implement effective cyber security ---inefficient spending, lack of centralization, and conflict of interests within private entities

Bossong & Wagner ’16 - Raphael, Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Ben, (“A Typology of Cybersecurity and Public-Private Partnerships in the Context of the EU.” *Crime, Law, and Social Change*, vol. 67, no. 3, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, pp. 274–79, doi:10.1007/s10611-016-9653-3.) – sel

Surveying EU cybersecurity and public private partnerships

The two EU agencies ENISA and EUROPOL are the main public operational or executive actors in the area of EU cybersecurity. Both actors are heavily dependent on cooperation with private actors for their organisational success, and are supposed to cooperate increasingly with each other. At the same time, they clearly have different mandates and respective relationships with private actors. The following overview therefore uses the typological differentiation with regard to the central tasks of PPPs, namely information-sharing and active assistance, and sets in relation to the different audience or layers that the two agencies appeal to.15 By providing a structured overview of the types of relationships these organisations engage in, we hope to provide a clearer picture of what cybersecurity partnerships in this area actually look like in practice.

ENISA

ENISA, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, is the main organisation for structural cybersecurity, i.e. at the infrastructural and technical/ logical level. ENISA was founded in 2004 and has gradually established itself as a leading provider of technical advice in Europe (see Farrand and Carrapico in this issue) In particular, the agency produces a large volume of conceptual papers and organises exercises,16 workshops and expert meetings on cybersecurity. In 2013, ENISA was given an expanded and permanent legal basis, which defined its organisational mandate as follows ([92], 43): The Agency should contribute to a high level of network and information security, to better protection of privacy and personal data, and to the development and promotion of a culture of network and information security for the benefit of citizens, consumers, businesses and public sector organisations in the Union, thus contributing to the proper functioning of the internal market.^ In light of this, regular interactions across the public-private divide are clearly essential to the work of ENSIA. At a very general level, this can be illustrated by the inclusion of private representatives in the so-called permanent stakeholder group, which should assist the management of ENISA after the last revision of its mandate. 17 But already well before, ENISA conducted extensive research on different models and potential of PPPs in the ICT sector [93], which supports several arguments made in the first part of this article. Thus, the agency underlines that private actors are often unwilling to share information on a voluntary basis and that formal agreements or structures are necessary to ensure the operational usefulness of PPPs to both private and public actors. At the same time, the focus of ENISA on more infrastructural layers of cybersecurity suggests that public-private interactions are more likely to take the form of coregulation for general standard setting or security certification. 18 This reflects in a range of multi-stakeholder governance forums overseen by ENISA, such as the BENISA Internet infrastructure security and resilience reference groupB, 19 and the „Electronic Communications Reference Group (ECRG)B20 These groups interact with other forums for technical self-regulation, mainly the International Standards Organisation (ISO), the European Electronic Standards Institute (ETSI, with MoU) and CEN CELENEC for further industrial standards.21 ENISA also engages in a range of wider educational and awareness raising activities that should stimulate greater cybersecurity investments among both public and private actors. Aside from a so-called awareness raising community of ENISA – which seems to have been discontinued after 2010 -,22 the largest coordinated effort is the so-called cybersecurity awareness month, which includes various private organisations.23 However, these educations activities cannot be considered as sustained and substantial PPPs, since its target audience is diffuse and participants are not expected to enter into more regular relationships with ENISA. PPPs for information sharing (logical and user layer) For more substantial PPPs for cybersecurity, one can instead turn to private forums for sector-specific information sharing and which have contacts to ENISA. Examples are the so-called European Financial Institutes – Information Sharing and Analysis Centre 24 (EU-FISAC), or the so-called European Cyber Security Protection Alliance (CYSPA),25 which united both business and research institutions. A somewhat confusing array of additional private initiatives and platforms, such as the Internet Security Alliance for Europe and the Security Alliance for Europe, also interact with ENISA and comment on EU policy.26 However, the main PPP officially led by ENISA has been the so-called BEuropean Public + Private Partnership for Resilience^ (or E3PR). This initiative emerged in the context of a larger EU policy programme to increase the security of Critical Information Information infrastructures (CIIP) [94]. The E3PR format generated a number of thematic working and expert groups that should exchange information on relevant vulnerabilities and define policy options (compare Farrand and Carrapico in this issue).27 However, the E3PR failed to generate tangible results due to the diversity of stakeholders and avenues for action that could be considered before the EU proposed a more specific legislative agenda [95]. Information sharing channels for CIIP issues remained highly fragmented in Europe,28 particularly when aiming to address the cross-sectoral vulnerabilities of infrastructures. A later official evaluation report of the E3PR underlined that that multiple conflicts of interests with regard to the confidentiality of data or prospect of costly mandatory security measures further hampered the emergence of the desired partnership [96]. By 2013, the EU already debated the aforementioned NIS directive [52], which should extend mandatory information sharing on cybersecurity incidents from telecommunications providers 29 to other critical infrastructure providers. Even before the directive has been politically agreed on in December 2015, ENISA created the socalled NIS platform to succeed the E3PR. By mid-2015, the NIS platform listed more than 200 members - with approx. 110 of them representing business interests -,30 and had met at least five times. This indicates a substantial effort of public-private networking. Yet the terminological change from a partnership to a platform for private industry is telling. Rather than promoting regular operational or administrative cooperation, as we would expect in a classic PPP, the NIS Platform has worked on a clearer agenda for co-regulation and related policy options. For these purposes, ENISA created three working groups, namely on risk management, information exchange and incident coordination and, finally, secure ICT research and innovation. Clearly, these tasks may also apply to operational PPPs, but at the time of writing, the NIS platform has not reached beyond several conceptual papers that were intended to prepare the implementation of the upcoming NIS directive. 31 This stakeholder consultation should also be viewed in wider international processes, as reflected in a recent and first EU US meeting in that format. 32 In sum, the NIS platform should mainly be regarded as a supporting process of regulatory governance of critical infrastructures. Active assistance (logical and user layer) Yet one point to another area where ENISA may take on a more operational role for cybersecurity with private actors already, namely via its support for Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). CERTs33 have been developed since 2006 onwards. At the time, a few member states had started to create such units in emulation of the US, which pioneered this instrument already in 1990s [97]. By 2012, a separate EU CERT has been created,34 while regular network activities and standardization of procedures to coordinate the work of national CERTs were underway.35 The web presence of the EU CERT further includes regular news items on cyber threats and vulnerabilities of various applications. These CERTs arguably constitute of boundary case for PPPs as defined for the purposes of this paper. The leading US model is mainly public organisation, which maintains close contacts with private business.36 Various national CERTs in Europe clearly have strong ties with the private sector37 – or conversely, CERTs of leading IT providers, such as the German Telecom, maintain close contacts with the public sector, including the EU level. 38 The EU CERT Mechanism similarly lists various private companies and internet providers as Bpartners^ 39 for regular information sharing. However, public authorities also increasingly seek to provide their own cyber response capacities without having to partner with, or to rely on, private assistance. 40 For instance, the so-called European Governmental Cert Group 41 and officially listed partners of the EU-CERT are purely made up of public authorities,42 while a recent analytical paper uses the added qualifier of national CSIRTs (nCSIRTs), even if there remain significant interfaces with private actors [97]. So formalised governance networks can only be made out among public sector CERTs. This interpretation of CERTs as moving away from PPP should be tested in further comparative empirical research. In sum, ENISA expresses strong support for public private partnerships for cybersecurity, but mainly acts as a facilitator for technical co-regulation and certification with private actors (at the logical and infrastructure layer). ENISA organises stakeholder consultations in relevant EU regulation on cyber and critical infrastructure, as in the NIS Platform, and supports general awareness raising on cybersecurity among both public and private actors. Yet there is limited evidence for more operational PPPs, as official CERTs increasingly focus on the specific internal or defensive needs of public actors.

## EU Leadership INB

### 2AC – INB – Squo Solves

#### Squo solved – tech giant legislation.

Kang 22 [Cecilia Kang, 4-22-2022, "As Europe Approves New Tech Laws, the U.S. Falls Further Behind", No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/22/technology/tech-regulation-europe-us.html, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

In just the last few years, Europe has seen a sweeping law for online privacy take effect, approved far-reaching regulations to curb the dominance of the tech giants and on Saturday reached a deal on new legislation to protect its citizens from harmful online content.

For those keeping score, that’s Europe: three. United States: zero.

The United States may be the birthplace of the iPhone and the most widely used search engine and social network, and it could also bring the world into the so-called metaverse. But global leadership on tech regulations is taking place more than 3,000 miles from Washington, by European leaders representing 27 nations with 24 languages, who have nonetheless been able to agree on basic online protections for their 450 million or so citizens.

### 1AR – INB – Squo Solves

#### Massive regs from EU.

Satariano 22 [Adam Satariano, 3-24-2022, "E.U. Takes Aim at Big Tech’s Power With Landmark Digital Act", No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/technology/eu-regulation-apple-meta-google.html, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

The European Union agreed on Thursday to one of the world’s most far-reaching laws to address the power of the biggest tech companies, potentially reshaping app stores, online advertising, e-commerce, messaging services and other everyday digital tools.

The law, called the Digital Markets Act, is the most sweeping piece of digital policy since the bloc put the world’s toughest rules to protect people’s online data into effect in 2018. The legislation is aimed at stopping the largest tech platforms from using their interlocking services and considerable resources to box in users and squash emerging rivals, creating room for new entrants and fostering more competition.

What that means practically is that companies like Google will no longer be able to collect data from different services to offer targeted ads without users’ consent and that Apple may have to allow alternatives to its App Store on iPhones and iPads. Violators of the law, which will take effect as early as later this year, could face penalties of up to 20 percent of their global revenue — which could reach into the tens of billions of dollars — for repeat offenses.

The Digital Markets Act is part of a one-two punch by European regulators. As early as next month, the European Union is expected to reach an agreement on a law that would force social media companies such as Meta, the owner of Facebook and Instagram, to police their platforms more aggressively.

With these actions, Europe is cementing its leadership as the most assertive regulator of tech companies such as Apple, Google, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft. European standards are often adopted worldwide, and the latest legislation further raises the bar by potentially bringing the companies under a new era of oversight — just like health care, transportation and banking industries.

“Faced with big online platforms behaving like they were ‘too big to care,’ Europe has put its foot down,” said Thierry Breton, one of the top digital officials in the European Commission. “We are putting an end to the so-called Wild West dominating our information space. A new framework that can become a reference for democracies worldwide.”

### 2AC – INB – Inevitable

#### The CP is going to inevitably happen – the aff isn’t key.

Csernatoni 19 [[Raluca Csernatoni](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2_6#auth-Raluca-Csernatoni), PhD in International Relations from Central European University, 2019. The EU’s Technological Power: Harnessing Future and Emerging Technologies for European Security. Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe, 119–140. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2\_6 DOA: 6/20/2022 //ArchanSen]

This comes at a moment when National Defence Technological and Industrial Bases (DTIBs) in Europe have increasingly come under pressure to produce competitive defence capabilities, due to budgetary restrictions and defence market forces. There is no denying the fact that the centre of gravity for security and defence technology R&D and innovation has shifted from the national and military levels to the corporate and civilian ones, because of a variety of factors, such as economic austerity reasons and the sharp decline of national defence R&D investment programmes in the post-Cold War period in Europe. In this regard, the maintenance of a strong EDTIB was set out to become a top mission for the EDA and the European Commission, by improving security and defence capabilities, the military expenditure of member states and by focusing on enhancing European security via the development of innovative and competitive high-end technologies.

Political will has been developing in the EU concerning high-tech security and defence capacity build-up, as demonstrated by the policy initiatives and strategies recently spearheaded by the EDA and the European Commission to empower the European defence technology and innovation sectors. The rapprochement between the EDA and the European Commission has increased significantly as shown by their combined efforts to converge national strategic needs and advocate for a more coherent pan-European common defence policy. The 2016 policy initiatives, the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (SDIP) and the European Commission’s European Defence Action Plan (EDAP), are prefiguring a new practice of collaboration between the EDA and the Commission to create a stronger European defence market, to revitalise the European defence industrial base and to encourage member states to spend more on defence research and emerging technologies. The European Commission’s launch of the Preparatory Action (PA) on CSDP-related research and in partnership with the EDA as the hub of defence research is indicative of such moves. The PA is a support programme in the form of a one-off and of limited duration budget (Crespo 2015), which shifts financing opportunities for the European defence industries from EU member states to the EU per se.

The European Commission has proposed the PA back in 2014 for testing the added-value of CSDP-related research within a permanent EU framework, outside the limits of the Horizon 2020—The EU Framework Program for Research Innovation type of civilian or dual-use R&D programmes. At the time, if proven successful in the time-frame of 2017–2019, the PA was heralded as a potential game-changer in the field of European defence research, paving the way for permanent funding from the part of the European Commission to support CSDP-related research. In an unprecedented strategic move, it also opened the EU financing machine for defence technologies research and development beyond the limiting constraints of civilian or dual-use R&D and Research and Technology (R&T) under the structural funds such as the Horizon 2020. The European Defence Fund (EDF), presented in the European Commission’s EDAP from 30 November 2016 is case in point, becoming the first supranational financial tool to directly and exclusively fund cross-border European defence research projects, with a view to developing innovative and high-end security technologies.

In light of the above, a clear and resolute direction can be observed, with conclusive steps taken in strengthening, deepening, and widening the EU-level defence collaboration. There is no denying the fact that the European Commission has had an agenda-setting role, taking important steps to improve efficiency and cooperation in the defence sector: it increased its efforts to complete the Single Market for defence; it strengthened the competitiveness of the European industry; and it bolstered the European defence research by maximising synergies between civilian and military research (European Commission 2014). These steps are also achieved through the SDIP and the EDAP, the European Commission and the EDA working closely together with member states to outline these initiatives. By taking into account such developments, the chapter proposes a two-tiered research strategy, by first exploring the emergence of a European trans-sectoral security field via a new configuration of power relations and a convergence of interests at the intersection of different national, supranational and corporate levels in the case of future-oriented and high-tech research and development. Second, it examines the role of EU-led innovation and governance of such technologies in the specific cases of artificial intelligence and autonomous robotics. The chapter builds on an interpretive methodology that mobilises qualitative content analysis of various types of textual data, such as official discourses, key reports, policy documents, speeches and declarations, press releases, academic research, grey literature from think tanks and expert evaluations. Consequently, the chapter investigates the EU’s agenda-setter potential as a key driver in galvanising the European high-tech and defence sectors to bridge the technological-innovation gap across intergovernmental-supranational, civil-military and public-private nexuses in Europe to bring about a ‘European comprehensive approach’ to future and emerging security technologies. In doing so, it also problematizes the possible implications of Brexit on the European governance and development of future and emerging technologies. Finally, it highlights the EU’s efforts in translating technological innovation in these fields into a potential governance edge and the transformation of the EU into a technological powerhouse.

## Semiconductor INB

### 2AC – Squo Solves

#### US and Europe are already taking measures to create semiconductor resiliency.

Arcuri 22, Gregory Arcuri is a research assistant for the Renewing American Innovation (RAI) Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)., (Gregory, “How Is the U.S. Cooperating with Its European Allies on Issues of Technology?” , CSIS, April 5, https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/how-us-cooperating-its-european-allies-issues-technology) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

The Council’s first meeting in September 2021 led to a series of notable outcomes on issues where significant agreement already exists. For example, on the issue of the global semiconductor shortage, both sides are committed to “identify[ing] gaps in the semiconductor value chain” and enhancing their respective semiconductor ecosystems. The U.S. and Europe have already begun taking important steps towards this shared goal. Of note, the European Commission has drafted legislation to mobilize over €43 billion in public and private funds to double its share of the global semiconductor manufacturing market by 2030. Meanwhile, in the United States, lawmakers continue to debate the CHIPS for America Act and the FABS Act, which provide lump-sum and tax-based incentives for chip manufacturers to “onshore” their operations. While these appear to be self-serving initiatives, the two sides view them as critical to ensuring mutual resiliency in a critical strategic industry.

### 1AR – Squo Solves

#### The European Chips Act solves---increases RnD, domestic production, and global partnerships to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities.

Cota 22, Jillian Cota is a research intern with the Renewing American Innovation Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC., (Jillian, “The European Chips Act: A Strategy to Expand Semiconductor Production Resiliency”, CSIS, March 7, https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/european-chips-act-strategy-expand-semiconductor-production-resiliency) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

In February 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the European Chips Act, which adds €15 billion to an existing €30 billion in public investments to create new STEM-focused programs, attract new talent to Europe, and build new infrastructure. These actions are part of a strategy to support a thriving European semiconductor industry ecosystem, averting future shortages of semiconductors, and promoting investment into the European semiconductor industry.

Through this legislation, the Commission hopes to: Increase EU resilience to supply chain disruptions like those created by building more domestic capacity. Make Europe a long-term industrial leader in semiconductors, increasing its global in manufacturing from 9% to 20% by 2030.

Areas of Focus: The European Chips Act focuses on five specific areas:

Research and Development: The announcement by the European Commission President calls for further allocations of funds for research and development (R&D) to keep up with global competitors. To augment the level of research, the Commission will further invest €3.3 billion in two current programs: €1.65 billion to the “Horizon Europe” program and €1.65 billion to the “Digital Europe” program. The "Horizon Europe'' program focuses on pre-competitive research, development, and innovation in the area of semiconductors while, “The Digital Europe” program looks to make digital domains and technology widely available for all businesses and the general public to maximize performance in key industries.

“From the lab to the fab”: The European Chips Act also calls for more effectively translating research into industrial innovation and market-feasible products. Experts emphasize that Europe must bridge the gap between excellence in laboratory research and onshore manufacturing to sustain leadership in semiconductors and other advanced technologies.

Industry Production: The European Chips Act recognizes that advanced production facilities come with huge up-front costs. Europe is looking to host “first of its kind” facilities through the creation of Integrated Production Facilities, which are factories that design and produce semiconductor components that serve the European market and through Open EU Foundries for chip design, which are facilities that design and produce components for other industrial actors such as medical devices and computer programming. The EU Commission sees Europe lagging in chip production, so if the EU can accomplish building these Integrated Production Facilities and Open EU foundries, the EU commission goal of increasing European chip production from 9% to 20% of global production by 2030 becomes significantly more reachable.

Local Support: European policymakers see the need to support the local skill base and the network of smaller, innovative companies and start-ups as a part of their strategy to grow their semiconductor and high technology ecosystems. To do this, the European Commission has established the “EU Chips Fund” which will contribute €2 billion to create a more competitive market for semiconductor start-ups to participate in and address skill shortages. Additionally, the Commission wants to help in the retention of employees that have the skills that these start-ups need to be successful and to find industrial partners for these start-ups to collaborate with.

Overhaul the European Supply Chain: The strategy also seeks to advance the European Union’s supply chain. Within the EU, the Commission wants to encourage Member States and industry stakeholders to coordinate efforts towards an improved European supply chain for semiconductors.. To enable a rapid response to the current shortages, the Commission has created a list of recommendations to the Member States. Along with streamlining policies of member states, Europe is also looking to build partnerships with the United States and other nations to create a more resilient global semiconductor network.

### 2AC – Impact Turn

#### Semiconductor dependencies prevent Taiwan invasion---capitalist peace theory!

Chitkara 22, Hirsh Chitkara is a reporter at Protocol focused on the intersection of politics, technology and society. Before joining Protocol, he helped write a daily newsletter at Insider that covered all things Big Tech., (Hirsh, “The great onshoring: Inside the transcontinental chip race”, Protocol, May 20, https://www.protocol.com/policy/us-eu-semiconductors-ttc-onshoring) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Fabricating our way into World War III? Political economists have long theorized that great powers are less likely to go to war if they rely on one another for trade. The so-called “capitalist peace theory” is a core tenet of classical liberalism — one of the many reasons scholars say we should embrace globalization, even if it comes with quite a few nasty side effects. Install a McDonald’s in your capital city, Thomas Friedman posited in 1996, and no other McCountry will invade. (Russia has since served as the counterpoint to this theory, though McDonald’s is now leaving Russia.) If the capitalist peace theory holds, then reshoring chips would have considerable geopolitical ramifications, according to Rao. In this sense, he added, China poses a greater threat: “The Chinese can’t actually threaten Taiwan currently, or at least not so easily, because they need the chips.” To secure that supply, China is expected to pour well over $100 billion dollars into developing its domestic semiconductor industry. “The way to frame this is whether or not China requires Taiwan — and in the future, they may not,” Rao said.

CHART OMITTED

China’s stated aim is to reunite with Taiwan, not demolish it. So in theory, Taiwanese manufacturing shouldn’t be at risk. But Rao said delicate chip fabrication facilities could be damaged in the event of an invasion, and that would be a supply risk China would likely not want to take.

## Defense Autonomy INB

### 2AC --- EU Autonomy Fails

#### European autonomy fails

Luke Coffey 20, MS, Politics and Government of the European Union, London School of Economics, Director, Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation, Daniel Kochis, MA, Comparative Political Science, Fordham University, Senior Policy Analyst, European Affairs, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, Davis Institute, 8/10/20, "NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow", The Heritage Foundation, Speical Report, No. 235, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/nato-the-21st-century-preparing-the-alliance-the-challenges-today-and-tomorrow

NATO and the European Union. The strength of the transatlantic alliance revolves around the axis of NATO, which has done more to promote democracy, peace, and security in Europe than any other alliance—including the European Union—since its inception in 1949. Far from being outmoded, NATO today is more relevant and crucial for maintaining transatlantic security than it has been since the end of the Cold War. While some in Brussels and across the halls of power in Europe may have dreams of an independent EU Army or an independent EU defensive apparatus capable of replacing NATO and the U.S. military, true EU “strategic autonomy” in defense is a chimera.

The EU will never be able to provide the peace and stability that NATO— with feet firmly rooted in both North America and Europe for the past 70 years—has delivered, and will continue to deliver. While EU-led defense initiatives may be able to provide some defense improvements at the margins, the outsized costs include decisions that enervate NATO, exacerbate existing fractures within Europe, and severely stress the transatlantic link.

NATO’s reflection should approach further NATO–EU initiatives cautiously. While the EU undoubtedly maintains competencies that will be necessary and useful for responding to the challenges associated with a return to great power competition, the EU cannot fulfill the security role in Europe currently performed by the U.S. and NATO. For peace and security, it is essential that NATO maintain its keystone role in European defense policy. This means firmly pushing back against EU defense integration efforts that are not in the interests of the Alliance.

When it comes to EU strategic autonomy, NATO should insist that former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s “3Ds” continue to be respected—(1) no decoupling of U.S. security from European security, (2) no duplication of structures or initiatives that already exist within NATO, and (3) no discrimination against non-EU NATO members.

### 2AC --- AT: Europe leads

#### Europe can’t lead---the US is irreplaceable

Ana Palacio 11/20/20, former minister of foreign affairs of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group and a visiting lecturer at Georgetown University, “ America, Heal Thyself,” Project Syndicate, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joe-biden-heal-divided-america-liberal-world-order-by-ana-palacio-2020-11

The stakes are high. If the pole around which the international order was built continues to weaken, the dangerous drift of recent years – exemplified by the absence of a coordinated global response to the COVID-19 pandemic – will continue. Even the diplomatic muscle memory that has enabled the limited recent examples of cooperation will fade.

Why shouldn’t someone else lead? Simply put, because no one else can. There is no single actor, or even a collection of actors, that is ready to take America’s place.

Consider the European Union, which has long fancied itself a potential standard-bearer of liberal values. It certainly possesses many of the attributes of an exemplar: vibrant and diverse cultures, dynamic civil societies, well-institutionalized systems for upholding human rights and the rule of law, and a commitment to multilateralism.

And yet, in many areas vital to global leadership, the EU falters. A lack of political will has meant that Europe has consistently misallocated resources. As a result, it has failed to build up adequate shared capacity or even to create the conditions for doing so. For example, EU leaders insist that Europe needs to achieve “strategic autonomy,” without agreement on what that means.

More fundamentally, the EU lacks the self-assurance it would need to serve as a credible and compelling example for the world. To change that, it must first define and convey a compelling raison d’être, which can form the basis of its own revitalized model. It must then dedicate significant resources – time, effort, and money – to building the capacity and status needed to project its influence. In short, the EU must walk the walk.1

Unless and until it does, the US will be indispensable, because it is irreplaceable. That makes it all the more important for the Biden administration not only to re-engage with the world and the multilateral system as a convening power, but also to find a way to heal the US. Only a reasonably united America can stand tall, look forward, and serve as the beating heart of the liberal international order.

### 2AC --- No Impact – Africa War

#### No African War

Burbach and Fettweis 14 – [David T. Burbach, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, B.A. in Government from Pomona College, and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Christopher Fettweis, Associate Professor in International Relations at Tulane University, 2014, The Coming Stability? The Decline of Warfare in Africa and Implications for International Security, http://www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/CSP-35-3%20Burbach%20and%20Fettweis.pdf] Jeong

Anarchy has not come to Africa – at least not in the expanding, all-encompassing way meant by the pessimists of a decade or two ago. The continent is far from uniformly peaceful, and current outbreaks of violence are reminders of the need for more progress. On the whole, however, Africa is less war-torn than at any time in the past, which runs contrary to widespread perceptions that exist even among foreign policy experts. Kaplan remains unchanged, claiming recently that his most important predictions have actually been borne out.95 However, the evidence suggests that despite neo-Malthusians fears, by most measures life on the continent is improving. War is becoming less of a threat to the life of the average African than emerging middleincome threats like traffic accidents or diabetes. Nor have realist fears of predatory wars and wholesale remaking of the map of Africa come to pass. That is not meant to dismiss the suffering of residents of the Central African Republic, South Sudan or northern Nigeria, nor to suggest that all is well. There are hundreds of millions of Africans who do not face as great a threat of armed conflict as they once did, however. It is important to see Africa as more than 50 distinct countries, some – and by historical standards, relatively few – of which are beset by warfare, even if they continue to face other, even greater challenges. Nothing guarantees that these trends will continue. Indeed, several require active maintenance. If the outside world stops responding to African hotspots, at least with diplomatic resources and avoiding support to plunder-financed armed groups, conflict becomes more likely. Intense American –Chinese competition could encourage internal conflict or spur vicious circles of tension between neighbours. The United Nations, former colonizers and AFRICOM have all been useful in helping to bring stability to the continent, but their long-term interest is hardly assured. A global recession or a wave of protectionism could dash optimism about economic growth. But for now, for the first time in quite some time, there is reason for optimism about the decline of warfare in Africa. What the United States and other outsiders should not do, however, is continue to look at Africa though a lens that overemphasizes conflict and a few crisis-afflicted nations. Additional American support for African peacekeeping capability is welcome, but an increase in American investment in African economies would do even more good for more people. Policymakers should emphasize to the business community how much is now going right in Africa. The Obama Administration has taken useful steps in that direction, but at other times shows signs of the ‘Africa-as-Anarchy’ mindset. Programmes to help African governments build capacity outside the military-security sphere could be expanded, such as police and judicial systems, or the infrastructure and service delivery needs of large cities in which a growing share of Africans live. Africa faces many problems. Peace does not necessarily bring freedom, justice, or prosperity. But today a far greater percentage of people on the continent live without serious risk of dying due to warfare than pessimists expected. On the contrary, ‘end of war’ optimists may prove to be right about Africa too, if on a slower time scale than most of the world. Perhaps a rising generation of leaders and citizens are being influenced by both global norms and expectations of greater opportunities. Africa is surely the hardest test of the global trend away from international conflict. If conflict can no longer find a home there, will it be welcome anywhere?

### 2AC --- No Impact – Latin Am War

#### No Latin America war

Cárdenas 11 (Mauricio, senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative at the Brookings Institution, was cabinet minister during the Gaviria and Pastrana administrations in Colombia. Think Again Latin America, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think\_again\_latin\_america?page=full)

**"**Latin America is violent and dangerous." Yes, but not unstable. Latin American countries have among the world's highest rates of crime, murder, and kidnapping. Pockets of abnormal levels of violence have emerged in countries such as Colombia -- and more recently, in Mexico, Central America, and some large cities such as Caracas. With 140,000 homicides in 2010, it is understandable how Latin America got this reputation. Each of the countries in Central America's "Northern Triangle" (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) had more murders in 2010 than the entire European Union combined. Violence in Latin America is strongly related to poverty and inequality. When combined with the insatiable international appetite for the illegal drugs produced in the region, it's a noxious brew. As strongly argued by a number of prominent regional leaders -- including Brazil's former president, Fernando H. Cardoso, and Colombia's former president, Cesar Gaviria -- a strategy based on demand reduction, rather than supply, is the only way to reduce crime in Latin America. Although some fear the Mexican drug violence could spill over into the southern United States, Latin America poses little to no threat to international peace or stability. The major global security concerns today are the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism. No country in the region is in possession of nuclear weapons -- nor has expressed an interest in having them. Latin American countries, on the whole, do not have much history of engaging in cross-border wars. Despite the recent tensions on the Venezuela-Colombia border, it should be pointed out that Venezuela has never taken part in an international armed conflict. Ethnic and religious conflicts are very uncommon in Latin America. Although the region has not been immune to radical jihadist attacks -- the 1994 attack on a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, for instance -- they have been rare. Terrorist attacks on the civilian population have been limited to a large extent to the FARC organization in Colombia, a tactic which contributed in large part to the organization's loss of popular support.

### 2AC --- No Impact – NoKo War

#### No noko war

Campbell 17 (Charlie Campbell - Beijing Correspondent for TIME – “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Are Not Reason Enough to Start a War” – 4/28/17 - http://time.com/4759066/north-korea-kim-jong-un-donald-trump-nuclear-weapons/)/TK

But even if North Korea were not to retaliate, there’s no guarantee strikes would achieve their goal of permanently retarding the regime’s nuclear program. Plus there would be dire strategic consequences. Beijing would be livid. The U.S. would have started yet another 21st Century war, utterly alienating international public opinion, tearing up its hard-fought Asian security alliance and inviting Chinese hardliners to push it out of the region. According to an August 2016 study by Brown University, the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan — in which the U.S. military has been involved — have directly cost 370,000 lives since 2001. (Not that we’ve stopped counting.)¶ Read More: Can North Korea Actually Hit the U.S. With a Nuclear Missile?¶ However, the broader point is that North Korea, for all its many and egregious faults, is a state hell-bent on survival. It might have nuclear weapons, but the regime cannot use them without guaranteeing its own destruction. That’s how nuclear deterrents work. North Korea is not ISIS with an “end of days” deathwish, wreaking jihad across the globe in its quest for a global caliphate.¶ “Why are people panicking about North Korea?” asks Daniel Pinkston, an East Asia expert at South Korea's Troy University. “It’s secular, they want to survive and they are very cognizant of power balances. They are not suicidal.”

### 2AC --- No Impact – China War

#### No China war

Shifrinson 19—(assistant professor of international relations at Boston University). Joshua Shifrinson. 2/8/19. The ‘new Cold War’ with China is way overblown. Here’s why. February 8, 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/02/08/there-isnt-a-new-cold-war-with-china-for-these-4-reasons/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f8ca8195c4e4>)

Is a new Cold War looming — or already present — between the United States and China? Many analysts argue that a combination of geopolitics, ideology and competing visions of “global order” are driving the two countries toward emulating the Soviet-U.S. rivalry that dominated world politics from 1947 through 1990. But such concerns are overblown. Here are four big reasons why. 1. The historical backdrops of the two relationships are very different When the Cold War began, the U.S.-Soviet relationship was fragile and tenuous. Bilateral diplomatic relations were barely a decade old, U.S. intervention in the Russian Revolution was a recent memory, and the Soviet Union had called for the overthrow of capitalist governments into the 1940s. Despite their Grand Alliance against Nazi Germany, the two countries shared few meaningful diplomatic, economic or institutional links. In 2019, the situation between the United States and China is very different. Since the 1970s, diplomatic interactions, institutional ties and economic flows have all exploded. Although each side has criticized the other for domestic interference (such as U.S. demands for journalist access to Tibet and China’s espionage against U.S. corporations), these issues did not prevent cooperation on a host of other issues. Yes, there were tensions over the past decade, but these occurred against a generally cooperative backdrop. 2. Geography and powers’ nuclear postures suggest East Asia is more stable than Cold War-era Europe The Cold War was shaped by an intense arms race, nuclear posturing and crises, especially in continental Europe. Given Europe’s political geography, the United States feared a “bolt from the blue” attack would allow the Soviet Union to conquer the continent. Accordingly, the United States prepared to defend Europe with conventional forces, and to deter Soviet aggrandizement using nuclear weapons. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union also feared that the United States might attack and wanted to deter U.S. adventurism. Concerns that the other superpower might use force and that crises could quickly escalate colored Cold War politics. Today, the United States and China spend proportionally far less on their militaries than the United States and the Soviet Union did. Though an arms race may be emerging, U.S. and Chinese nuclear postures are not nearly as large or threatening: Arsenals remain far below the size and scope witnessed in the Cold War, and are kept at a lower state of alert. As for geography, East Asia is not primed for tensions akin to those in Cold War Europe. China can threaten to coerce its neighbors, but the water barriers separating China from most of Asia’s strategically important states make outright conquest significantly harder. Of course, as scholars such as Caitlin Talmadge and Avery Goldstein note, crises may still erupt, and each side may face pressures to escalate. Unlike the Cold War, however, U.S.-Chinese confrontations occur at sea with relatively limited forces and without clear territorial boundaries. This suggests there are countervailing factors that may give the two sides room to negotiate — and limit the speed with which a crisis unfolds. 3. The Cold War had just two major powers The Cold War took place in a bipolar system, with the United States and Soviet Union uniquely powerful, compared with other nations. This dynamic often pushed the United States and the U.S.S.R. toward confrontation and contributed to more or less fixed alliances; moreover, it encouraged efforts to suppress prospective great powers, such as Germany. In 2019, it’s not at all clear we are back to bipolarity. Analysts remain divided over whether the U.S. unipolar era is waning (or is already over) — and, if so, whether we are heading for a new period of bipolarity, modern-day multipolarity or something else. Regardless, most analysts accept that other countries will play a central role in East Asian security affairs. Russia, for example, still benefits from legacy military investments, India is developing economically and militarily, and Japan is beginning to build highly capable military forces to complement its still-significant economic might. Even if these nations aren’t as powerful as the United States or China, their presence makes for more fluid diplomatic arrangements and more diffuse security concerns than during the U.S.-Soviet competition. The resulting security dynamics are therefore likely to look very different. 4. Ideology plays less of a role in U.S.-Chinese relations Many people see the Cold War as an ideological contest between U.S.-backed liberalism and Soviet-backed communism. But that’s not the whole story. The early 20th century saw liberalism, communism and fascism vie for ideological preeminence. With fascism defeated alongside Nazi Germany, the postwar stage was set for a struggle between communism and liberalism to reinforce the U.S.-Soviet contest. That each ideology claimed universal scope ensured that the ideologies served as rallying cries for Third World conflicts, which were subsequently associated with the U.S.-Soviet struggle. The respective “ideologies” of the United States and China do not favor this type of contest today. Indeed, analysts calling for a hard-line stance against China have faced difficulties even identifying a coherent Chinese ideological alternative. And while some researchers claim that a nascent ideological contest pitting an “autocratic” China against the “liberal” United States is emerging, this narrative ignores the political contests that shape Chinese politics (and have parallels in U.S. politics). Autocracies and democracies often cooperate. And on one important ideological issue — how they organize their economic lives — China and the United States have both embraced economic growth via trade, the private sector and semi-free markets.

### 2AC --- No Impact – EU Soft Power

#### Soft power is impossible

Wunsch 19—(post-doctoral researcher in the European Politics Group at the Center for Comparative and International Studies). Natasha Wunsch. Sept 7 2019, "The European Union in Times of Crisis: Internal Challenges and a Changing Global Order", European Consortium for Political Research, <https://ecpr.eu/Events/SectionDetails.aspx?SectionID=842&EventID=123>)

Since 2009, the EU appears to be operating in a context of permanent crises. Internally, it is grappling with the crisis of the Eurozone and economic governance, the migration crisis, the negotiations surrounding Brexit, and a creeping but no less dangerous challenge to democracy as the core of the Union’s shared values. The manifestations of these crises have been so prolonged and recurring that they raise the question whether they represent systemic flaws that call into question the long-term prospects of European integration. This question has been posed with relation to European economic and eurozone governance, but is equally relevant when it comes to Eurosceptic trends among EU citizens and the rise of populist and nationalist governments that explicitly challenge core institutions and values of the Union. Brexit negotiations and the enduring difficulties in finding a workable form of future cooperation with the UK after the deadline for leaving the Union further illustrate how some of the core tenets of the EU’s order, including the free movement of people in the internal market, are coming under pressure. At the same time, the EU faces a multitude of external challenges. These range from the strained transatlantic relationship due to the increasingly isolationist stance of the United States, the rise of a stronger China, and an increasingly assertive Russia. The EU’s ability to bring positive change to its neighbourhood is challenged by the enduring instability and outright political crises in the countries of the Eastern Partnership and those that experienced the Arab Spring. These multiple crises challenge the EU’s emphasis on soft power as its privileged mode of engagement with third countries and risk fostering ever deeper Euroscepticism among the EU’s citizens.